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REcENT CASES
[F]rom and after the first day of July, eighteen hundred
and thirty seven, it shall be as necessary to record deeds of mortgage
or trust on equitable titles* on real or personal property, as though
the grantor had the legal estate; and all bona fide deeds of mortgage
and trust, shall secure the parties according to the terms thereof, in
the order of their execution.
* (Emphasis added)
This statute gives priority to mortgagees according to time of execu-
tion. The reason for inserting this last clause into the 1887 act is not
known; nor can it be explained with certainty why this statute uses
execution as the criterion for priority rather than actual recordation.
One possible explanation for the statute's peculiar wording is that the
word "execution" was inadvertently used instead of recordation. An-
other explanation would be that the statute's purpose was to give
priority to the conveyance which was recorded immediately after
execution. Whatever the explanation and purpose of this clause, the
1852 legislature attempted to remove its ambiguities. The 1852 Ken-
tucky Revised Statutes contained these changes: (1) The first clause
of the 1837 statute was dropped and the "notice" statute was changed
to apply to both legal and equitable interests;' 8 (2) The second clause
of the 1837 statute was enacted as a separate section of the Revised
Statutes (now KRS 382.280) and the word "execution" was replaced,
in effect, by the word "recordation"."9 It seems ironic that, as KRS
882.280 came into its present form, it at the same time lost its original
purpose of requiring equitable interests to be recorded-since now this
requirement was embodied in the "notice" statute.
The preceding discussion makes it apparent that the Kentucky
recording statutes are repetitive and contradictory in relation to deeds
and mortgages. Kentucky, unlike Arkansas, has ignored the statutes
which do not fit the general scheme of the Kentucky recording system.
KRS 382.280 was enacted approximately 120 years ago for a specific
purpose; this purpose ceased to exist after 15 years. The only possible
purpose that it can now serve is to cast doubt upon the present re-
cording law and at the same time cause fear that it may someday be
resurrected. It ought to be repealed. Luther House
PLEADING-INTEMaP=AnON OF RuLE 8.01, KENTUCKY RuLEs OF CivIL
PnOCIEDURE-CAUSE OF ACrbON REvrvED?-In a contract with the lessee
of certain coal mines, plaintiff acquired the right of hauling all coal
mined under the lease. Defendants subleased the mines, but they
18 Rev. Stat. of Ky., Ch. 24, sec. 11, p. 197 (Turner and Nicholas 1852).
19 Id., sec. 12, p. 198 (Turner and Nicholas 1852).
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refused to allow plaintiff to haul any coal from the mines. Plaintiff
brought an action for breach of contract alleging that defendants had
knowledge of the lessee's obligations to plaintiff at the time they sub-
leased the property. However, the complaint did not allege that de-
fendants had assumed the lessee's contractual obligations, and assump-
tion by defendants was essential to plaintiff's right of action against
defendants who were not parties to the original contract. The lower
court held that this defect was fatal and entered judgment dismissing
plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Held: judgment affirmed. Johnson v. Coleman, 288
S.W. 2d 348 (Ky. 1956).
Johnson v. Coleman constitutes the first interpretation by the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky of the pleading requirements of Rule 8.01 of
the new Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of testing
the sufficiency of a complaint.' The Court, Stanley, C., said:
We may agree with the appellants' argument as to the
liberality of the new Rules of Procedure with respect to stating a
cause of action, particularly that rule which requires that a pleading
need contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." CR 8.01. But the simplification
and liberality extend to the manner of stating a case and are not so
great as to obviate the necessity of stating the elements of a cause of
action or defense, as the case may be.2
Thus it appears that in testing the sufficiency of a complaint, Ken-
tucky will require the statement of all the elements of a cause of
action as under the old code pleading, although greater generality will
be allowed in the manner of stating those elements.
In interpreting the equivalent federal rule, Rule 8(a), a majority
of federal courts have been extremely reluctant to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Bowles
v. Sauer, the Court stated:
It is a well settled principle of law that a complaint should
not be dismissed unless it appeared to a certainty that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
proved in support of the allegations set forth therein.a
This view reflects a philosophy as to the functions and aims of the
pleadings that arose with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
1 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. ..2288 SW 2d at 349 (Ky. 1956).
3 6 FRD 571 at 578 (WD Pa. 1947); see also cases cited 2 Moore, Federal
Practice see. 8.13 at 1653 (2d ed. 1948) and 1 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure see. 255 at 437-38 (1950).
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Procedure. As it was succinctly stated in an early case under the rules:
The modem philosophy concerning pleadings is that they
do little more than indicate generally the type of litigation that is
involved. A generalized summary of the case that affords fair notice
is all that is required.4
According to this view, it is no longer the function of the pleadings to
formulate issues or even to advise the adverse party of all the facts
involved. The various pre-trial and discovery devices are supposed to
provide a much more efficient means of satisfying those needs.5 There
is no requirement that the pleader state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action,0 but rather it has been said that the rule "envisages
the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of
the claim."7 Under this view that the pleadings need give only fair
notice, it is certainly arguable that the plaintiff's complaint in Johnson
v. Coleman should not have been dismissed as there was the possibility
that, at trial, plaintiff might have proved that defendants had in fact
assumed the lessee's obligations.
However, a respectable minority of Federal courts have placed an
interpretation upon the rules which is more nearly that reflected by
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. It has been held that a complaint
must do more than merely "create a suspicion"8 or "hint"9 that plaintiff
is entitled to relief. The statement of facts as opposed to conclusions
couched in broad generalities has been required in a significant num-
ber of cases,' and it has been pointed out that the statement of facts is
necessary in order that the adverse party may prepare a proper an-
swer." Moreover, many courts have recognized that pleadings must
serve an important function in formulating and defining the issues. 12
4 Securities and Exchange Commission v. Timehurst, 28 F Supp. 34 at 41
(ND Calif. 1939).
5 2 Moore, note 3, supra, sec. 8.13 at 1652.
6 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F 2d 774 at 775 (CCA2 1944).
7 Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts, at 19 (1955).
S Hays v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 FRD 599 at 600 (WD Mo. 1947).
9 Caribe Candy Co. v. Mackenzie Candy Co., 78 F Supp. 1021 at 1022 (ND
Ohio 1948).
10 Foley-Carter Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 128 F 2d 718 (CCA5
1942); Schaefer v. Macri, 196 F 2d (CA 9 1952), cert. denied 344 US 832
(1952); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 69 F Supp. 297 (DC N.J.
1946); Porter v. Shoemaker, 6 FRD 438 (MD Pa. 1947); Cole v. Riss & Co., 16
FRD 116, (",VD Mo. 1954).
11 Baird v. Dassau, 1 FED 275 (SD N.Y. 1940); Johnson v. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. of California, 1 FRD (DC Minn. 1941).
"2Sharp v. Barnhart, 117 F 2d 604 (CCA 7 1941); Price Vacuum Stores,
Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 223 F 2d 269 (CCPA 1955); Baird v. Dassau, note 11,
supra; Johnson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California, note 11, supra; Brickhart
v. Union Barge Line Corp., 6 FRD 579 (WD Pa. 1947); Trantham v. Canal Ins.
Co., 117 F Supp. 241 (ED Tenn. 1953), aff. 220 F 2d 752 (CA 6 1955).
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Numerous leaders in the legal profession have also taken exception
to the premise that the pre-trial conference and other discovery devices
are so efficient in the formulation of the issues and in informing the
adverse party of the factual basis of plaintiffs claim that they pre-
empt the role of the pleadings in those fields. These devices have been
cited as causing unnecessarily delayed and expensive litigation.1 3 As
stated by one exasperated Federal Judge:
Why put the Court and the parties to the trouble of
searching through various papers to determine what the issues are
when the complaint and answer might serve the purpose-a purpose
they have served from time immemorial.
Nor do we consider it good practice leading to "the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" to say that
the party seeking full information on the issues may obtain it by
pre-trial conference. Such a proceeding requires time of the Court
and the litigants ... 14
Perhaps the most serious charge against pleading as it exists in a
majority of Federal courts is that unfounded and exaggerated claims
are encouraged since it is unlikely that they will be dismissed where
no issues are reached in the pleadings.Y5 Believing that it is no longer
necessary to state a cause of action in the pleadings, some feel that the
foundation of any judgment may be left uncertain and res adjudicata
imperiled.' 6 Others have emphasized that an unwarranted burden is
placed upon the defendant to determine the facts and issues of plain-
tiff's case. "It is true that the discovery procedures help, but," as Judge
J. A. Fee pointed out, "unless the adversary's case is known from the
outset, there is difficulty in discovering about what to inquire." 7 De-
fenders of the liberality allowed under the notice theory of pleading
maintain that a defendant seldom has no knowledge of the facts in-
volved. However, critics of notice pleading reply that, "It is not
13 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, "Claim or Cause of Action," 13
FRD 253 at 255, 261, 279 (1952); Fleming v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 39
F Supp. 237 at 240 (WD Ark. 1941).
14Bush v. Skidis, 8 FRD 561 at 564-65 (ED Mo. 1948). Defendant's
motion to make the complaint more definite and certain was sustained where
plaintiff alleged negligence generally. Even under the old code pleading, a gen-
eral allegation of negligence was sufficient in Kentucky, Louisville and N. R. Co.
v. Shearer, 119 Ky. 648, 59 SW 330, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 929 (1900). Bush v. Skidis
has been questioned as to soundness in Petrikin v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 14
FRD 31 (WD Mo. 1953) and in McKenzie v. Springfield City Water Co., 14
FED 503 (WD Mo. 1953).
15 0. L. McCaskill, "The Modem Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Out-
side the Shades," 38 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952); Judicial Conference of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, note 13, supra, at 255-56.
16 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, note 15, supra at 255; J. H.
Tucker, Jr., "Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System of Fact Pleading;
Expose des Motifs," 13 La. L. Rev. 395 at 420 (1953).
17 J. A. Fee, "The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," 48 Col. L. Rev. 491 at 494 (1948).
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enough to say... that the defendant knows or should know the facts.
What any litigant wants to know is what his opponent says are the
facts."' 8 At least one Federal Judge believes that the function of the
various pre-trial devices has been misinterpreted:
Discovery, Summary Judgment Procedure, and Pre-trial Pro-
cedures . .. are not issue-forming devices, as supposed, but devices
relating to ascertaining evidence to support issues, and .. .they are
dependent upon the pleadings to disclose the issues; ...they are
strictly supplementary, not substitutional.19
These criticisms have been reflected in the retention of the require-
ment of stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action by
Louisiana in adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,20 in the
interpretation placed upon a rule similar to Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules by New Jersey,21 and in a call for amending Rule 8(a) so as to
require the statement of facts constituting a cause of action.22
In Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co.2 3 the court reflected the view
most nearly approximating that of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Johnson v. Coleman. McLaughlin, C. J., stated:
This court thinks that the requirements of Rule 8 are not
met by a mere "notice of disaffection" to the opposite party ...
This is the implication we find necessarily flowing from sub-section
(2) of sub-paragraph (2) of Rule 8: "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Appar-
ently the only practical way of making such a showing is to state the
prima facie elements of the claim. . . These elements should be
indicated by operative facts, in order that entitlement to relief can be
shown by the complaint. ....
Thus it seems to be the purpose of Rule 8 to relieve the
pleader from the niceties of the dotted i and the crossed t and the
uncertainties of distinguishing in advance between evidentiary and
ultimate facts, while still requiring, in a practical and sensible way,
that he set out sufficient factual matter to outline the elements of his
cause of action or claim, proof of which is essential to his recovery.
... Therefore, if a pleader cannot allege definitely and in good faith
the existence of an essential element of his claim, it is difficult to see
why this basic deficiency should not be exposed at the point of mini-
mum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.24
This view requires more than the nebulous statement that the pleader
need only disclose the "circumstances, occurrences, and events" 25 in
18 J. H. Tucker, Jr., note 16, supra, at 425.
10 P. M. Hall, Jr. (SD Calif.), Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, note
13, supra, at 263.
20 J. H. Tucker, Jr., note 16, supra, at 395.21 Grobart v. Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, 2 N.J. 136, 65
A 2d 833 (1949); Anderson v. Modica, 4 N.J. 383, 73 A 2d 49 (1950).
22Judicial Conference for the Ninth Circuit, note 13, supra, at 253.
23 114 F Supp. 643 (DC Hawaii 1953).
24 Id. at 645.
25 See note 7, supra.
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support of the claim, but it avoids the semantic labyrinth of 'ultimate
fact', 'evidentiary fact', and 'conclusion of law.' While critics of notice
pleading desiring a return to strict fact pleading may not be entirely
satisfied by this interpretation, it is felt that application of the rule set
forth in the Johnson and Daves cases will mean an earlier formulation
of the issues involved. A defendant should be able to prepare his
answer more readily since the complaint should clearly state the basis
of the claim. A liberal application of the right to amend the complaint
should prevent this rule from working any hardship upon plaintiffs.
More important perhaps, courts should be able to recognize the un-
meritorious claim at the earliest possible time, thereby fulfilling the
avowed purpose of the rules-"the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."26
Prior to the Johnson case, there were indications that Kentucky
would not adopt the extreme view of notice pleading. As stated by the
Civil Code Committee:
The proposed rules make no fundamental change in the
content of pleadings, although they do adopt a change in terminology.
... In one sense the present and proposed requirements are identical,
since a stated claim which gives rise to legal or equitable relief is the
essence of what we term a "cause of action." The real difference is
one of emphasis, which is characterized in the proposed rule by the
absence of the word "facts" and the positive requirement that the
statement be "short and plain." 2 r
It has been emphasized at many times that what constituted good
pleading under the old code is good pleading under the new rules.28
In view of the great freedom of amendment permitted, the rule of the
Johnson case will not result in throwing out a meritorious case, but it
is obvious that the Court of Appeals of Kentucky will not accept the
view that:
No matter how likely it may seem that the pleader will be
unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an
opportunity to try to prove it.29
Therefore care should be taken to insure that the complaint clearly
states every element of the plaintiff's cause of action.
James Park, Jr.
26 Rule 1, Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.27 B. B. Fowler and . M. Catlett, "Report of the Civil Code Committee,"
16 Ky. St. Bar J. 23 at 27 (1951); see also notes to Rule 8.01, Tentative Draft of
the Rules of Civil Procedure of Kentucky, at 29 (1952).28 Fowler and Catlett, note 27, supra, at 29; Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 90
(1954).
29 Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F 2d 631 at 635 (CCA3 1942).
